Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2010

Trademark Remedies and Online Intermediaries
Stacey Dogan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Do Not Delete

4/7/2010 5:15 PM
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by
*
Stacey L. Dogan
For several years now, courts and commentators have tussled over the
question of whether online intermediaries can face liability under
trademark law. Because both case law and commentary have largely
focused on the threshold question of “trademark use,” we know little
about what specific behavior will subject intermediaries to liability and
what remedies might follow. This Essay takes some preliminary steps
toward addressing those questions.
It begins by classifying claims against intermediaries into three general
groups: general-confusion claims, failure-to-police claims, and failure-torespond claims. It contends that differences in the nature of these claims
justify distinct approaches, both in evaluating liability and in
considering the appropriate scope of relief. In particular, it contends that
judges evaluating claims against intermediaries should resist trademark
law’s general preference for broad prohibitory injunctions in favor of a
tailored approach, given the significant benefits that can result from
intermediaries’ use of trademarks online.
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INTRODUCTION

Scholars have spilled much ink over the question of whether and
1
when online intermediaries can face liability under trademark law. So
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far, both the scholarly debate and the case law have focused on the
standards for infringement, asking whether parties such as search
engines and auction sites can qualify as infringers under the Lanham
2
Act. Can Google, for example, face liability for allowing advertisers to
place ads keyed to protected trademarks? Is eBay legally responsible for
every counterfeit product sold on its site? Despite years of debate, the
substantive standards are only just beginning to take shape, and they
reflect no model of clarity. But a few broad principles are beginning to
emerge: that intermediaries can qualify as infringers under trademark
3
law; that their liability should turn on their own role in creating
4
confusion; and—at least in my optimistic reading of the courts’
opinions—that courts should be sensitive to the dangers of defining
5
intermediary liability too broadly. In particular, at least some courts and
commentators have expressed concern that overly-expansive liability
could impoverish the online marketplace by making it harder for
1
See, e.g., Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark
Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 373 (2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis,
Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007);
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use,
92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use];
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Internet]; Greg
Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2008); Mark P. McKenna,
Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 828; Uli Widmaier,
Use, Liability, and the Structure of Trademark Law, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 603, 605 (2004);
cf. Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507,
595 (2005); Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 107 (2005).
2
See supra note 1; see also Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 124 (2d
Cir. 2009); Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
3
See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 124; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape
Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004); Google Inc. v. Am. Blind &
Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18,
2007). The European Court of Justice, on the other hand, has held that search
engines who “use” marks merely to facilitate another’s advertisements are not
themselves infringers. See Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08, & C-238/08, Google
France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 WL 1030379, ¶ 56 (March 23, 2010) (Grand
Chamber) (“[S]uffice it to note that the use, by a third party, of a sign identical with,
or similar to, the proprietor’s trade mark implies, at the very least, that that third
party uses the sign in its own commercial communication. A referencing service
provider allows its clients to use signs which are identical with, or similar to, trade
marks, without itself using those signs.”).
4
See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 131 (“What Rescuecom alleges is that by
the manner of Google’s display of sponsored links of competing brands in response
to a search for [a] brand name (which fails adequately to identify the sponsored link
as an advertisement, rather than a relevant search result), Google creates a likelihood
of consumer confusion as to trademarks.”); Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007
WL 1159950, at *4; see generally Stacey L. Dogan, Beyond Trademark Use, 8 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 135, 136–37 (2010).
5
Cf. Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1034–36 (Berzon, J., concurring) (noting
that the non-confusing use of trademarks to increase consumer choice should not
constitute infringement).
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competitors, critics, sellers of complementary products, and others to
6
reach customers who might benefit from their informational offerings.
Given the plodding pace of our judicial system and the tendency
7
toward settlement, none of the intermediary trademark suits has reached
a final disposition; so we know little about what remedies courts will
impose if and when they find liability. Indeed, the literature on
intermediary liability has devoted little attention to the question of
remedies. Yet the scope of relief granted in these cases will largely
determine whether the threat of trademark liability serves as a limited
and constructive market regulator or a drag on competition and speech.
If courts exercise their remedial discretion wisely and sparingly, they may
well avoid the chilling effects feared by many scholars, as well as
8
advocates for consumer and speech interests. If, however, courts grant
injunctions that require intermediaries broadly to police their networks,
we could see an impoverishment of the information marketplace, to the
detriment of competitors, consumers, and our society at large.
This Essay offers some observations on the appropriate scope of
relief in trademark suits against intermediaries. My comments are not
only preliminary, but also highly speculative, because we have yet to see a
single decision finding an intermediary liable under substantive
trademark standards. Nonetheless, the existing case law offers some clues
about the theories of liability most likely to persuade a court; this Essay
focuses on these theories in thinking about suitable remedies.
Normatively, I take it as a given that trademark law exists to promote
informational clarity in markets, with fair competition as the underlying
9
and ultimate goal. This economic lens—though not uncontested—
6

See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
See, e.g., Agreed Final Judgment, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 4:07-CV487-A (N.D. Tex. July 17, 2008), available at http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/
district-courts/texas/txndce/4:2007cv00487/169927/104/0.pdf (the confidential
settlement approved by the Court was presented by both parties’ counsel on Aug. 16,
2007); Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Jews for Jesus v. Google
Inc., No. 05 CV 10684 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006), available at http://docs.justia.com/
cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1:2005cv10684/278090/1/0.pdf
(involving a blog hosted on Google, resolved through settlement that transferred the
blog to the trademark holder).
8
See Brief for Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance,
Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d 123 (No. 06-4881-CV) (warning of risks to consumer
interests if online intermediary liability is defined too broadly); Brief for Electronic
Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Rescuecom Corp., 562
F.3d 123 (No. 06-4881-CV) (warning of threats to free speech from broad
intermediary liability under trademark law); Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use, supra
note 1, at 1689; Dogan & Lemley, Internet, supra note 1, at 838.
9
See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001)
(“[P]rotection for trade dress exists to promote competition.”); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (“[T]rademark law, by preventing
others from copying a source-identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of
shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it quickly and easily assures a
potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by the same
producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the
7
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reflects the prevailing Supreme Court attitude toward trademarks, as well
10
as the dominant approach among scholars. And it has important
implications for trademark remedies: to serve trademark law’s goals,
remedies should achieve an overall improvement in the quality of
information available in the marketplace. Traditionally, trademark
injunctions have done this by preventing parties from using others’
marks to confuse consumers over the source of their products. An
injunction in such a case prevents a tangible harm—deceptive or
unreliable product information—at a relatively low cost to the public,
because the defendant has other choices to brand its goods.
The ratio of benefit to harm from trademark injunctions has no
doubt changed over time as courts have expanded the scope of
trademark holders’ rights. Many scholars have challenged various aspects
of this expansion on the ground that they limit competition and speech,
and encourage socially wasteful expenditures on advertising and brand
11
identity. The risk of anticompetitive effects becomes especially great
past.” (citation omitted)); Standard Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 363 F.2d 945,
954 (5th Cir. 1966) (“The essence of competition is the ability of competing products
to obtain public recognition based on their own individual merit. A product has not
won on its own merit if the real reason the public purchases it is that the public
believes it is obtaining the product of another company.”); S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4
(1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (“Trade-marks, indeed, are the
essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing
articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other.”); see also David S.
Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1659, 1687–89 (2004) (contending that the Supreme Court has
returned to an unfair competition model of trademark protection, after flirting with a
property-based approach); cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S.
205, 215 (2000) (expressing concerns about anticompetitive effects of overly broad
trade dress protection).
10
See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (2003); Robert G. Bone,
Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2105 (2004); Dogan &
Lemley, Internet, supra note 1, at 778; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268–69 (1987). But see
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark
Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1639 (2007) (critiquing the search costs theory of
trademark protection and contending that “as trademarks assume a greater social
significance and business models elevate trademark law as a principal tool of
information policy, trademark law may have to take into account concerns about
individual autonomy that range more broadly than mere marketplace choice”
(footnotes omitted)); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1842 (2007) (challenging the economic account of
trademark protection: “Rather than forcing square pegs into the round holes of
economic efficiency, advocates of the efficiency approach should acknowledge that
courts traditionally operated under a different theoretical framework and be upfront
about their own normative agenda.”).
11
The literature is substantial, and I mention only a few examples here. See, e.g.,
Bone, supra note 10, at 2181; Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman:
The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1731 (1999); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 485 (1999); William McGeveran,
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when trademark law protects the product itself, rather than names or
labels affixed to products. In such circumstances, trademark protection
can inhibit competition in product markets, leading to allocative
12
inefficiencies and inflated prices.
Whatever the harms from trademark injunctions against individual
defendants, however, the prospect of injunctions against intermediaries
raises the stakes dramatically. By “intermediaries,” I mean parties who are
not themselves branding their products under a mark but are using the
mark in some way to help a third party reach potential customers. EBay,
for example, allows the use of marks as search terms on its auction site to
connect sellers with people who might have an interest in their products.
When the seller is offering a product manufactured by the trademark
13
holder, eBay has an unambiguous legal right to do this. An injunction
prohibiting eBay from using any particular trademark as a trigger for
advertisements, then, would squash many uses that trademark law has
long recognized as legitimate and that promote the law’s informationrelated goals. This is so even if the injunction was based on a defensible
legal conclusion that eBay’s use had led, or could lead, to consumer
confusion in some cases.
At the same time, trademark holders, courts, and many
commentators understandably bristle at the idea of leaving
intermediaries completely immune from liability under trademark law.
Like other parties that enable infringement, some online intermediaries
may deliberately sow confusion to divert attention to their advertisers’
14
products. Or they might refuse, despite clear notice, to block obvious
infringement taking place on their services. When this happens, liability

Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 51 (2008); McKenna, supra note 10,
at 1916; cf. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1205 (1948).
12
See Lunney, supra note 11, at 479–80 (discussing welfare effects resulting from
trademark protection of product features).
13
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Clearly, eBay and other online market websites may properly promote and facilitate
the growth of legitimate secondary markets in brand-name goods.”); see also Designer
Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819–20 (D. Ariz. 2009)
(holding that an online seller had a legitimate interest in using the protected mark as
a keyword to generate ads, when it sold the mark-holder’s products on its site); see
generally Scott Fetzer Co. v. House of Vacuums, Inc., 381 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2004)
(allowing resale and repair shop to use names of products it sells and services); Nitro
Leisure Prods., LLC v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(permitting seller of refurbished golf balls to sell them under the manufacturer’s
mark); Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 61–62 (2d Cir. 1992) (“As a
general rule, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true
mark even though the sale is not authorized by the mark owner.” (footnote
omitted)).
14
Cf. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2009)
(worrying that narrow approach to intermediary liability might exempt search
engines from liability for using trademarks “in ways designed to deceive and cause
consumer confusion”).
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may well be appropriate. But, because of the potential cost of broad
injunctions, courts must take care in crafting relief where benefits
outweigh the burdens on competition and speech.
The remainder of this Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part II describes
the nature of trademark claims asserted against online intermediaries
and tries to anticipate which claims might succeed, given the right facts. I
divide intermediary claims into three types: general-confusion claims,
which focus on the intermediary’s purported role in creating confusion
over the general integrity of its informational services; failure-to-police
claims, which attempt to hold the intermediary liable for any confusion
enabled by its use of trademarks, even without any direct causal
relationship between the intermediary’s own use and the resulting
confusion; and failure-to-respond claims, which turn on the
intermediary’s failure to respond to complaints of infringement by users
of its services.
Part III considers the implications of this claims classification for
remedies analysis in intermediary suits. Given the difference in kind
between traditional trademark infringement actions and claims against
intermediaries, I contend that the general preference for broad
prohibitory injunctions in trademark infringement suits makes little
sense in the latter cases. Courts must use their general equitable
discretion to tailor the remedy to the particular culpability of the
intermediary defendant, taking care to avoid collateral damage. In
particular, courts should take seriously their obligation to take the
broader public interest into account when evaluating the proper scope of
injunctive relief. I offer some concrete but tentative suggestions for
courts crafting injunctions in intermediary trademark suits.
II. DEFINING THE WRONG
Trademark suits against intermediaries are different animals than
15
the traditional, run-of-the-mill infringement suit. Most infringement
actions involve a claim against a defendant that is branding its products
16
under a mark. In evaluating liability, courts consider factors such as the
similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks, products, and

15
See generally Dogan & Lemley, Trademark Use, supra note 1, at 1670 (“[B]efore
the recent spate of Internet-related cases, no court had ever recognized a trademark
claim of the sort that trademark holders are now asserting. Trademark infringement
suits have always involved allegations of infringement by parties who use marks in
connection with the promotion of their own goods and services.”).
16
See id. at 1679–81 (discussing the historical distinction between direct and
contributory infringement claims); see, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d
141, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The test looks first to whether the plaintiff’s mark is entitled
to protection, and second to whether defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause
consumers confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of the defendant’s goods.”
(emphasis added)).
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17

customers; if the overlap creates a risk of consumer confusion as to the
source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the parties’ products or services, the
court generally enjoins the defendant’s continued use of the mark as a
18
brand.
In the typical trademark case against an online intermediary, in
contrast, the defendant is using a mark, not as a brand for its products,
but as an informational device to connect a third party—the advertiser—
19
with potential customers. The plaintiffs in these cases are not claiming
that the search engines are sowing confusion about the source of the
intermediaries’ products and services. Instead, plaintiffs argue that the
use of trademarks in keyword-based advertising causes confusion as to the
source of the advertisers’ goods or services and seek to hold the search
engine legally responsible for that confusion.
While both courts and plaintiffs can be frustratingly non-specific in
defining the nature and factual predicates for these intermediary
trademark claims, the claims appear to fall into three rough groupings,
which I call general-confusion claims, failure-to-police claims, and failureto-respond claims. Of course, most complaints allege an amalgam of
20
these categories; nonetheless, classification can prove useful in
disciplining courts and advocates to identify the nature of the
defendant’s culpability—a critical prerequisite to deciding what remedy
21
to impose in each case.
A. General-Confusion Claims
General-confusion claims take issue with the overall search and
advertising practices of search engines. Plaintiffs claim either that the
mere use of trademarks as keyword-triggers causes consumer confusion,
or that the search engine fails to adequately distinguish ads from search
results, leaving consumers flummoxed as to the difference between them.
17
See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961) (identifying factors for evaluating likelihood of confusion); AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979); see generally 4 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:19 (4th ed.
2009) (discussing the standard for infringement).
18
See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 30:1 (“An injunction is the usual and
standard remedy once trademark infringement has been found.”).
19
See generally Stacey L. Dogan, Trademarks and Consumer Information, in MEREDITH
LECTURES: NOUVELLES APPROCHES EN PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE DANS UN MONDE
TRANSSYSTÉMIQUE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: NEW APPROACHES TO IP IN A
TRANSSYSTEMIC WORLD] 321 (2007) (contending that trademark-related Internet
searches reveal consumer preferences and characteristics which search engines can
use to enable better matches between advertisers and potential customers); Eric
Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 509
(2005).
20
See, e.g., Complaint at 5, 16–18, 31, Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 4:08CV-626-A, 2009 WL 381995 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2009).
21
See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d) (requiring courts to define with particularity the basis
for injunctive relief and the behavior covered by the injunction).
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The first sort of claim—that keyword-triggered advertising is inherently
confusing—is highly problematic given the wide range of noninfringing
and non-confusing uses of this advertising method. As a result, even the
courts that have found plausible trademark claims against intermediaries
have shied away from condemning all keyword advertising, however
22
presented and labeled.
Courts have shown more sympathy, however, to the argument that
search engines’ presentation and labeling of advertisements contributes
23
to consumer confusion. These general-confusion claims are trademark
claims only in the broadest sense: Because some of these confused
consumers may have used a trademark in their query, they might be
doubly confused—in thinking that ads were organic search results, and
in thinking that the trademark holder had sponsored or sanctioned each
of them.
I have argued elsewhere that trademark law provides a poor vehicle
24
for addressing general-confusion claims, but these claims have found a
25
warmer reception in the courts. In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., for
example, the Second Circuit focused on general confusion in reversing a
district court’s dismissal of trademark claims against Google:
We have no idea whether Rescuecom can prove that Google’s use
of Rescuecom’s trademark in its AdWords program causes
likelihood of confusion or mistake. Rescuecom has alleged that it
does, in that would-be purchasers (or explorers) of its services who
search for its website on Google are misleadingly directed to the ads
and websites of its competitors in a manner which leads them to
believe mistakenly that these ads or websites are sponsored by, or
affiliated with Rescuecom. This is particularly so, Rescuecom
22
See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2009)
(emphasizing plaintiff’s allegations regarding context and presentation of
advertisements and search results); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns
Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting in dictum that trademark law
would not apply to the use of plaintiff’s marks to trigger ads for “sites that legitimately
use PEI’s marks,” sites that clearly identify their source in their ad, or sites that
“overtly compare PEI’s products to a competitor’s”); GEICO v. Google, Inc., No.
1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *6–7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (mem.) (holding that
plaintiff had failed to establish likelihood of confusion from Google’s keywordtriggered ads); see generally Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08, & C-238/08, Google
France v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2009 WL 2997620, ¶ 109 (Sept. 22, 2009 ) (opinion
of Advocate General Maduro) (finding that the use of trademarks as keywords to
trigger ads is not likely to lead to consumer confusion).
23
See Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 131 (“What Rescuecom alleges is that by the
manner of Google’s display of sponsored links of competing brands in response to a
search for Rescuecom’s brand name (which fails adequately to identify the sponsored
link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant search result), Google creates a
likelihood of consumer confusion as to trademarks.”); Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at
1030 (“[W]e are evaluating a situation in which defendants display competitors’
unlabeled banner advertisements, with no label or overt comparison to PEI, after
Internet users type in PEI’s trademarks.”).
24
See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 4, at 139–41.
25
562 F.3d at 124.
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alleges, when the advertiser’s link appears in a horizontal band at
the top of the list of search results in a manner which makes it
appear to be the most relevant search result and not an
advertisement. What Rescuecom alleges is that by the manner of Google’s
display of sponsored links of competing brands in response to a search for
Rescuecom’s brand name (which fails adequately to identify the
sponsored link as an advertisement, rather than a relevant search
26
result), Google creates a likelihood of consumer confusion . . . .

Several years earlier, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
Communications Corp., the Ninth Circuit was equally preoccupied with the
27
search engine’s failure to clearly label its ads. Netscape had moved for
summary judgment on Playboy’s claim that Netscape’s keyword
advertising practices constituted direct and contributory trademark
infringement. The Ninth Circuit found summary judgment
inappropriate based largely on a survey that suggested consumers were
28
confused as to the difference between search results and ads.
Throughout its opinion, the court emphasized the fact that the
29
competitor ads were “unlabeled.” While it never quite defined
“unlabeled,” the court appeared to mean two distinct things: first, that
Netscape had not clearly labeled the advertising section of its website;
and second, that the text of competitor ads did not identify the advertiser
30
or its relationship to the trademarked product. The court suggested—
without holding—that clearer labeling might have reduced the risk of
31
confusion.
To the extent that Playboy turned on confusion allegedly caused by
ad text—including the failure to “label” the source of particular ads—the
claims are more like failure-to-police or failure-to-respond claims,
discussed below. But to the extent that Playboy turned on Netscape’s

26

Id. at 130–31 (emphasis added).
See Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1029; see generally id. at 1036 (Berzon, J.,
concurring) (“Our opinion limits the present holding [rejecting defendant’s motion
for summary judgment] to situations in which the banner advertisements are not
labeled or identified.”).
28
Id. at 1026. Netscape had challenged the survey’s methodology and
conclusions, but in the absence of any countervailing survey by Netscape, the court
held that Netscape’s critique went only to the weight of the evidence, an
inappropriate inquiry at the summary judgment stage. Id. at 1027.
29
See id. at 1025 (“PEI asserts that users are likely to be confused regarding the
sponsorship of unlabeled banner advertisements.”); id. (“Some consumers, initially
seeking PEI’s sites, may initially believe that unlabeled banner advertisements are
links to PEI’s sites or to sites affiliated with PEI.”); id. at 1030 (noting that court is not
addressing situations of comparative advertising or advertising that identifies the
source of the ad: “Rather, we are evaluating a situation in which defendants display
competitors’ unlabeled banner advertisements, with no label or overt comparison to
PEI, after Internet users type in PEI’s trademarks.”); id. at 1036 (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
30
Id. at 1030.
31
Id. at 1030 & n.43.
27
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failure to adequately differentiate search results and ads, it falls squarely
within the general-confusion category.
General-confusion claims differ fundamentally from other
trademark claims against intermediaries because they focus on the
defendant’s own behavior, rather than imputing to it deceptive acts
32
committed by another. This has implications both in determining
liability and in evaluating the appropriate scope of relief. In evaluating
liability, it suggests that courts should find infringement only if the
plaintiff proves that the search engine’s failure to label, rather than its
advertiser’s statements or misstatements, is indeed causing confusion
33
among consumers. From a remedial perspective, it means that
injunctive relief should target the problematic behavior specifically. If the
problem is lack of labeling, the injunction should require labeling, rather
than imposing a general obligation upon the search engine to police all
conceivable infringement using its service. I discuss this remedial issue in
more detail below.
B. Failure-to-Police Claims
Under a failure-to-police approach, plaintiffs allege that particular
keyword-generated ads are confusing, and seek to hold the search engine
liable for failing to block the ads ex ante. The reasoning goes like this: the
search engine “used” the mark by allowing advertisers to purchase ads
keyed to the mark as a search term; some of these ads confuse
consumers, either by suggesting association with the trademark holder or
by failing to disclaim any relationship; and because the search engine’s
use of the mark played a but-for role in enabling this confusion, the
34
search engine itself is an infringer. I call these claims “failure-to-police”
claims because they suggest that the search engine has an affirmative
obligation to weed out infringing ads before they appear, rather than
after obtaining actual knowledge of their confusing nature.
I have argued elsewhere that failure-to-police claims, like their
failure-to-respond counterparts, should be evaluated under standards of
35
contributory, rather than direct, trademark infringement. The nature of
32

For this reason, general-confusion claims fit more closely into the traditional
model for direct trademark infringement than do the other forms of trademark
claims against intermediaries. See Dogan, supra note 4, at 151–53.
33
See id.
34
See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 20, at 37 (“[T]he use of American Airlines
Marks . . . within the text of Sponsor Result advertisements by third-party advertisers
is likely to deceive or cause confusion among web users . . . . Through their sale of the
American Airlines Marks . . . to third-party advertisers, Defendants provide such thirdparty advertisers with aid and material contribution to the third-party advertisers’
violations of the Lanham Act.”).
35
See Dogan, supra note 4, at 137–138. Under this approach, the likelihood-ofconfusion test would inquire into whether a particular advertiser was creating
confusion as to the source or sponsorship of its products or services; the search
engine’s liability would turn on whether it continued to facilitate the ad after
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these claims is intrinsically derivative because it turns on confusion
between the trademark holder and the advertiser’s products and services.
Trademark law has historically taken care not to impose liability in these
circumstances unless the intermediary induced the infringement or
continued to provide support to a particular infringer with knowledge
36
that its support was contributing to continuing infringement. And it has
done so for good reason. Just as the staple article of commerce doctrine
in copyright law protects sellers of “dual-use” technologies from liability
37
when those technologies are used to infringe, so too does trademark law
avoid imposing an obligation to investigate upon every party whose
38
product or service might contribute to infringement. The alternative
would give trademark holders effective economic control over noninfringing behavior—including behavior such as explicit comparative
39
advertising that promotes trademark law’s information-facilitating goals.
The fact that search engines use trademarks to trigger ads should
not affect the nature of this inquiry. Every area of intellectual property

receiving knowledge of its infringing nature. Failure-to-police claims, because they
seek to require an intermediary to police its network even before receiving any
specific knowledge, would rarely prevail under this standard.
36
See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (“[I]f a
manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or
if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is
contributorially responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.”); see also
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 925, 943 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“As
Inwood makes clear, only proof that defendants knew their products were being falsely
advertised by third party retailers is enough to trigger liability. . . . [The plaintiff] has
come forward with no evidence that defendants did in fact know [of the false
statements at issue].”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 949, 964 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (“Contributory infringement doctrine has always
treated uncertainty of infringement as relevant to the question of an alleged
contributory infringer’s knowledge.”).
37
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 441–42
(1984).
38
See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that flea market operator had “no affirmative duty to
take precautions against the sale of counterfeits” on its premises). If anything, the
Supreme Court has instructed courts to define third-party liability claims more strictly
in trademark law than in copyright law. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 439 & n.19
(noting the differences between copyright’s contributory infringement standard and
the “narrow standard for contributory trademark infringement” announced in
Inwood); see also Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955 F.2d at 1150 (“[T]he Supreme
Court tells us that secondary liability for trademark infringement should, in any
event, be more narrowly drawn than secondary liability for copyright infringment.”);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The tests
for secondary trademark infringement are even more difficult to satisfy than those
required to find secondary copyright infringement.”).
39
Cf. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 440–42 (“The staple article of commerce
doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for
effective—not merely symbolic—protection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of
others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.” (emphasis added)).
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law insulates parties whose behavior may contribute to infringement, but
40
also has substantial noninfringing use. Without doubt, trademarktriggered keyword advertisements have significant noninfringing
41
applications. They should no more lead to strict liability than should the
sale of look-alike drugs that may tempt pharmacists to make illegal
42
substitutions.
Failure-to-police claims, in other words, should generally fail in the
online intermediary context. Unless the defendant has induced
infringement or obtained actual knowledge of infringement by particular
advertisers, trademark doctrine should not make the defendant
responsible for the confusing content of its customers’ ads.
Nonetheless, some of the opinions addressing intermediary
trademark liability appear to have accepted a failure-to-police theory by
imputing to the intermediary the content of its advertisers’ ads. The
trend began in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., in
which the Ninth Circuit assessed Netscape’s liability by considering the
likelihood of confusion between its advertisers’ products and services, and
43
those offered by Playboy. In several places in the opinion, the court
suggested that Netscape had an affirmative duty to monitor the content
of its customers’ ads and to preempt customer click-throughs that
resulted from confusion:
Defendants monitor “click-through” rates on the advertisements
they display. That is, they monitor the number of times consumers
are diverted to their advertisers’ sites. They use the click-through
rates as a way to gauge the success of the advertisements and to
keep advertisers coming back to their services. Although some clickthroughs may be the result of legitimate consumer interest, not confusion,
some may be expected to result from confusion. Defendants will profit
from both kinds of click-throughs. And they do nothing to ensure

40

See Inwood Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. at 861 (White, J., concurring) (noting that
contributory trademark infringement doctrine precludes claims against parties based
merely on the sale of products legal in themselves but similar enough to a branded
product to create a risk of illegal substitution by third parties); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow
Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 989 (D. Mass. 1946) (refusing to impose
obligation on seller of legitimate cola product to take precautions to avoid product
substitution by “some rouges [sic] in the bar business”); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464
U.S. at 440–42 (introducing copyright’s staple article of commerce doctrine); see also
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980) (discussing staple
article of commerce doctrine in patent law).
41
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1030
(9th Cir. 2004).
42
Cf. Inwood Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. at 861 (“The mere fact that a generic drug
company can anticipate that some illegal substitution will occur to some unspecified
extent, and by some unknown pharmacists, should not by itself be a predicate for
contributory liability.”).
43
354 F.3d at 1026–29.
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that only click-throughs based on legitimate interest, as opposed to
44
confusion, occur.

The court did not indicate how the search engine could identify
click-throughs that resulted from confusion, but it did offer steps that
Netscape’s designers could take to reduce the risk of confusion-based
clicks: they could label the advertisements, they could “require that
advertisers identify themselves on their banner ads,” or they could
“remove the highly-rated terms ‘playboy’ and ‘playmate’ from their lists
45
of keywords,” particularly when the advertiser asked them to do so.
Eliminating the keywords from the list of triggers would, of course, satisfy
Playboy; but it would cut off use of the Playboy marks by numerous
46
parties with a legitimate interest in using the terms. The other
preventative measures suggested by the Court, albeit in dictum, raise
intriguing questions, both about trademark’s liability standards and
about the appropriate scope of relief.
From a liability perspective, the Court’s dictum suggests that, in
considering an intermediary’s liability for failure to police, courts should
take into account whether a change in the intermediary’s policies vis-à-vis
ad text could reduce the levels of infringement on its service. If requiring
advertisers to identify themselves in ad text reduced confusion, for
example, the court suggests that the failure to adopt such a policy might
be a reason to impose liability.
In the abstract, this approach has some appeal: if an intermediary’s
business model is causing infringement, and it can costlessly reduce that
infringement through a simple change in policy, then perhaps we should
47
charge it with doing so. But the real world rarely presents such simple
fixes. For one thing, in the search context, we lack reliable information—
let alone consensus—about which policies regarding ad text are most
48
likely to dispel confusion. While Playboy’s dictum suggests that explicit
comparisons between the advertiser and the trademark holder would
49
probably pass trademark muster, the district court in GEICO held that
44

Id. at 1029 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1028 (noting that Netscape had
done “nothing to prevent click-throughs that result from confusion” (footnote
omitted)).
45
Id. at 1028–29.
46
Playboy involved a somewhat unique set of facts because Netscape required any
advertiser of adult-related content to include the Playboy marks in the package of
keywords that would generate an ad for its product. See id. at 1023.
47
See generally Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary
Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 265 (2005) (contending that gatekeeper liability
“should turn entirely on the balance between the misconduct’s social costs and how
effectively the intermediary can sanction the misconduct.”).
48
See, e.g., GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *5 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (mem.) (noting weakness in survey whose “control did not reveal
which aspects of the insurance-related Sponsored Links caused respondents’
confusion—the use of GEICO’s mark in the ads or the ads’ mere reference to
insurance.”).
49
Playboy Enters., Inc., 354 F.3d at 1030.
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the use of trademarks in ad text creates confusion for which the search
50
engine might be liable. The GEICO court—relying on an admittedly
flawed survey—failed to distinguish between different ways in which
51
advertisers might incorporate trademarks into the text of their ads. The
truth is that some uses of trademarks in the text of advertisements may
well confuse consumers, but many others will inform rather than
confuse, and thus promote trademark law’s goals. Indeed, one could
argue that search engines would reduce confusion by insisting that their
keyword advertisers refer to the trademark holder and explain its
relevance to their products; this would ensure that consumers
understand the relationship between their search term and the ad at
52
issue.
My point is not to challenge or defend any particular view on which
policies on ad text would achieve the lowest level of infringement. I
mention the subtle difference between the GEICO and Playboy courts’
treatment of trademarks in ad text only to demonstrate that search
engines cannot solve the problem of confusion (if it exists) through a
single shift in ad text policy. Mentioning trademarks in ad text can
confuse, but it can also clarify. Whether a particular use clarifies or
confounds turns on the identity of the advertiser, the products it offers,
and the overall content of the ad. Given that, imposing liability on a
search engine because it allows trademarks to appear in ads reflects a
woeful mismatch between the definition of infringement and the harms
that infringement law is designed to address. And the injunction that
would naturally follow—an order to bar the use of trademarks in ads—
would prohibit all sorts of desirable, information-facilitating uses of
marks.
Failure-to-police liability, in other words, can do more harm than
good. It is precisely for this reason that trademark law—like every other
area of intellectual property law—generally avoids imposing any duty on
53
parties to prevent someone else’s infringement. In the copyright
50

See GEICO, 2005 WL 1903128, at *7. The court relied upon a survey finding
that ads using GEICO in their ad text generated high degrees of consumer confusion.
Presumably, few of these ads involved express and accurate product comparisons, or
any of the other uses of trademarks that are truthful and legitimate.
51
Id.
52
Both Yahoo! and Microsoft follow this policy. See Microsoft Advertising, Ad
Content Guidelines, http://advertising.microsoft.com/learning-center/best-practices/
ad-content-guidelines/#trademarks;
Yahoo!
Search
Marketing,
Trademarks,
http://searchmarketing.yahoo.com/legal/trademarks.php. Unlike Google, neither
Yahoo! nor Microsoft allows competitors to place trademark-triggered keyword ads,
but they do allow resellers and information sites to use trademark-triggered
advertising as long as the ad describes the particular product or information that can
be found at its site. See id. Google currently allows, but does not require, the use of
trademarks in advertisements by resellers, information providers, and sellers of
compatible products. See Google AdWords, What is Google’s Trademark Policy?, http://
adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?answer=145626.
53
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see
also cases cited supra note 38.
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context, courts have stopped short of requiring sellers to redesign dual54
use products to minimize third parties’ infringement. Patent law’s
contributory infringement standard likewise immunizes sellers of staple
55
articles, without inquiring into alternative designs or policies. While the
law of contributory trademark infringement is substantially less
developed, the Supreme Court has made clear that trademark
defendants deserve, if anything, broader protection against liability for
56
another’s infringement. The courts that have imputed trademark
57
infringement to intermediaries have violated this longstanding rule.

54
See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 n.12 (2005)
(“[I]n the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find
contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps
to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.”). But see In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“Even when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet filesharing service, . . . if the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a
contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it would have been
disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the
infringing uses.”).
55
See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 220 (1980) (noting
that distinction between staple and non-staple goods “ensures that the patentee’s
right to prevent others from contributorily infringing his patent affects only the
market for the invention itself.”); cf. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. at 932–33 (noting that
patent law’s staple article doctrine “absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item
with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be
misused.”).
56
See cases cited supra notes 36, 38; see also Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v.
Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that a flea
market operator “has no affirmative duty to take precautions against the sale of
counterfeits.”).
57
See, e.g., Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-5340 JF
(RS), 2007 WL 1159950, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2007) (noting that the Playboy court
had “weighed the Sleekcraft factors as if Netscape were responsible for the
competitors’ advertisements,” and doing the same in evaluating Google’s trademark
liability); 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 292–93 (D.N.J.
2006) (noting the search engine’s legitimate use of trademarks for “comparative
advertising, resale of JR’s products, or the provision of information about JR or its
products,” but nonetheless holding that “fairness would dissipate, and protection
under a fair use defense would be lost, if GoTo wrongfully participated in someone
else’s infringing use”); GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va.
2004) (“Accepting as true the facts alleged by plaintiff regarding the inclusion of the
marks in advertisements and the defendants’ overall control of their advertising
program, we find that plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to support their claims
that advertisers make a ‘trademark use’ of GEICO’s marks, and that defendants may
be liable for such ‘trademark use.’”). The court later significantly narrowed its
holding, finding that only ads specifically using GEICO’s marks were likely to cause
confusion, and expressing uncertainty over whether Google should face liability for
the ads. See GEICO v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *7 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 8, 2005) (mem.).
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58

Precedent aside, failure-to-police liability could make sense as an
economic matter if—and only if—the benefits from requiring
59
intermediaries to prevent infringement outweighed their costs. And the
costs of policing are substantial. Not only would the search engine’s
customers have to absorb the price of its monitoring efforts, but risk
60
aversion would no doubt lead to incursions on legitimate speech.
Absent compelling evidence that intermediaries could efficiently prevent
infringement—and that their prevention efforts would bring about more
benefit than cost—reason counsels against changing the law to impose
monitoring obligations on intermediaries.
C. Failure-to-Respond Claims
The third category of claims involves the intermediary’s failure to
respond after receiving knowledge of infringement resulting from use of
its service. This form of liability reflects a logical extension of trademark’s
61
contributory infringement doctrine. Mindful of the doctrine’s broad
potential reach, some courts have imposed an additional requirement
that a defendant providing a service have “direct control and
62
monitoring” over the directly infringing party.
If applied carefully, failure-to-respond liability has the potential to
achieve an effective balance between trademark holders’ interests in
preventing infringement and intermediaries’ interests in promoting fair
58

Since the precedent comes from the Supreme Court, only the Supreme
Court—or Congress—has the authority to change it. See Mann & Belzley, supra note
47, at 250 (“[T]he time has come for the Internet to grow up and for Congress and
the businesses that rely on the Internet to accept a mature scheme of regulation that
limits the social costs of illegal Internet conduct in the most cost-effective manner.”).
59
See id. at 265; cf. Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony for
Napster and Other Internet Technologies, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 950 (2001) (contending
that, in the copyright context, “if the nature of a party’s control over its users makes it
feasible and essentially costless to distinguish between infringing and non-infringing
applications, the law should require it to do so” (footnotes omitted)).
60
See Mann & Belzley, supra note 47, at 273 (noting costs of gatekeeper liability);
see generally James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (contending that risk aversion, combined with the iterative
nature of intellectual property doctrine, can lead to an ever-narrowing scope of legal
but unauthorized uses).
61
The Supreme Court’s first definition of the doctrine did not include parties
who provided services, rather than products, to known infringers. See Inwood Labs.,
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 (1982). Subsequent courts, however, have
extended the doctrine to those who continue to provide services to third parties,
when they have both control over the direct infringer and knowledge that they are
contributing to its infringement. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76
F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955 F.2d at 1148–49; see
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that
entities “that provide a marketplace for infringement and maintain direct control
over that venue” may face contributory liability if they have the requisite knowledge).
62
See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th
Cir. 1999); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795–800 (9th Cir.
2007); see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 505–06.
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and legitimate uses of marks in the online context. To be sure, it imposes
an obligation on the trademark holder to notify defendants of infringing
uses of their marks. As a result, most trademark holders have thus far
focused on more aggressive forms of liability, hoping that courts will put
the burden of enforcement on intermediaries. Because generalconfusion and failure-to-police claims may well prove inadequate to stem
particular acts of infringement, trademark holders may increasingly turn
to the failure-to-respond sort of claim.
As they develop this species of intermediary liability, courts should
keep in mind the same limiting principles that guided the discussion of
the other two forms above. In particular, in their haste to find a plausible
gatekeeper, courts should take care not to impose liability that would
threaten legal and legitimate uses of marks online.
1. Knowledge
In the context of failure-to-respond claims, most of the heavy lifting
will likely fall upon the courts’ definition of knowledge. If courts found
general knowledge of infringement enough to trigger a duty to respond,
they would effectively be adopting failure-to-police liability under the
guise of contributory infringement. At the other extreme, if courts
insisted upon incontestable proof of infringement, they would make it
virtually impossible for trademark holders to get effective relief, even
against blatantly infringing uses of their marks online. As a result, courts
in these cases should adopt a flexible approach to knowledge that gives
effective tools to trademark holders while protecting intermediaries
against liability that would ultimately disserve trademark law’s goals. I
suggest three guidelines that courts might follow in pursuing this goal.
First, for the reasons outlined above, courts should follow established
precedent and refuse to find knowledge based merely on the fact that the
63
defendant offers a service that parties can (mis)use to infringe. So far,
those courts that have considered intermediary claims through a failureto-respond lens have adhered to the traditional standard, requiring a
“showing that a defendant knew or had reason to know of specific
64
instances of actual infringement.”
Second, trademark holders observing a violation of their rights
should have a quick and efficient way to put intermediaries on notice of
claims of infringement. An intermediary that refused to accept such
notices, or implausibly denied having received them, could not escape
65
liability on that basis. Notice alone, of course, would not establish
63

See supra notes 37–38, 53–56 and accompanying text.
Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 510; cf. Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc.,
652 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that “‘exceptional
circumstances’ must be shown to prove the degree of knowledge required to impose
contributory liability for cybersquatting,” as distinguished from plain-vanilla
infringement).
65
See Fonovisa, Inc., 76 F.3d at 265 (“[A] swap meet can not disregard its vendors’
blatant trademark infringements with impunity.”); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp., 955
64

Do Not Delete

484

4/7/2010 5:15 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:2

knowledge of infringement; it “gives notice only of the [trademark
66
holder’s] position regarding the matter.” But notice would trigger a
duty to investigate the claim to determine whether infringement was
67
occurring.
Finally, courts should find “knowledge” of infringement only when
the infringement is sufficiently clear that no reasonable person could
68
view the use of the mark as protected or otherwise non-infringing. As
the Netcom court concluded in the copyright context:
Where a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack
of copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright holder’s failure
to provide the necessary documentation to show that there is a
likely infringement, the operator’s lack of knowledge will be found
reasonable and there will be no liability for contributory
infringement for allowing the continued distribution of the works
69
on its system.
This breathing space is especially critical in the trademark context.
Because trademark infringement turns on a complex set of factors
involving the parties’ respective products, customers, and sales and
marketing channels, evaluating a claim of infringement can be
70
challenging, even for a court. The context-specific nature of trademark
law’s defenses only compounds the difficulty of determining whether a
particular use infringes. Given the importance of preserving these nonF.2d at 1148–49 (finding that the knowledge requirement can be satisfied by proof
that the defendant was “willfully blind” to infringement occurring on its premises).
66
Solid Host NL, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; see also Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice
Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 691 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that “sixteen or
fewer days of inchoate suspicion—engendered solely by the allegations in [the
trademark holder’s] demand letter—cannot as a matter of law be deemed willful
blindness” to trademark infringement).
67
See Fare Deals, Ltd., 180 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
68
See id. at 691 (finding no knowledge of infringement when “[t]he
infringement at issue is not so transparent—even to the legally adept—as handbags
labeled Louis Vuitton and Gucci, cheaply made, lined with purple vinyl, and sold by
itinerant peddlers at bargain-basement prices” (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875
F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989))); see also Solid Host NL, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (“The
extent [of an intermediary’s duty to investigate] will be circumscribed by the relative
difficulty of confirming or denying the accusation under the facts of a particular
case.”); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 964
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (“The existence of numerous legitimate, non-infringing uses of the
[trademark] further illustrates the uncertainty inherent in the question of whether
NSI knew or had reason to know of infringing uses of domain name registrations,”
even after receiving notice from the trademark holder).
69
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
70
See Lockheed Martin Corp., 985 F. Supp. at 963 (“The likelihood of confusion test
examines the totality of circumstances under which a mark is used. The outcome of
the test cannot be predicted from an examination of the mark and the domain name
in connection with a brief statement of the purpose for which the mark is being
used.” (citation omitted)).
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infringing uses of marks—and given the availability of direct
infringement claims against advertisers to decide the close cases—courts
should err against imposing liability unless the claim of infringement is
verifiable and clear.
2. Continuing to Provide
After receiving sufficient notice, an intermediary that fails to
respond by disabling the infringement could well face liability under
71
trademark law. As a practical matter, most of the major search
engines—as well as eBay—arguably satisfy their obligations to respond to
notice of infringement. Each of them has a system under which
trademark holders may complain of infringement; and each has a policy
72
of reviewing those claims and disabling offending ads. EBay has a
complex procedure for responding to notices of infringement—a
procedure that the district court in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc. found
73
Nonetheless, the contributory
robust and legally adequate.
infringement framework provides a basis for liability against
intermediaries that act less responsibly in responding to trademark
holder claims.
D. A Word on Inducement
So far, I have said nothing about the second form of contributory
liability anticipated by the Inwood court: liability for inducement.
Inducement liability, which requires a defendant to “intentionally
induce[] another to infringe a trademark,” is unlikely to apply to most
74
online intermediaries. When it does apply—and the evidence shows a
75
deliberate scheme to encourage infringement—liability should follow.
The arguments in favor of protecting non-infringing uses have little
76
weight when a defendant is intentionally inducing others to infringe.
71

See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996); cf.
AT&T Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1433 & n.14 (3d Cir.
1994) (finding no claim for contributory infringement when defendant “took
appropriate steps to reprimand and discipline” the party engaged in direct
infringement).
72
See Yahoo! Search Marketing, supra note 52; Google AdWords, supra note 52.
73
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“[T]he Court finds that eBay responded appropriately to notice of specific
infringing items . . . .”).
74
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). See also 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.”).
75
See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2009)
(expressing concern about a rule under which “the operators of search engines
would be free to use trademarks in ways designed to deceive and cause consumer
confusion”).
76
Cf. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 (2005) (“[W]here
evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put
to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”).
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III. SETTING REMEDIAL GOALS
Courts have broad discretion in crafting remedies in trademark
77
infringement suits. According to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, courts must take into account not only the harms resulting
from the infringement, but also the public interest and the defendant’s
78
interest in legitimate uses of the mark. In the intermediary context, this
means that courts should craft injunctions narrowly to address the
wrongful conduct by the defendant and must take care not to impede
legitimate, information-facilitating uses of marks.
With those goals in mind, I offer a few modest suggestions to courts
entering injunctions in trademark suits against intermediaries.
Doctrinally, my proposals break no new ground. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure instruct every court entering an injunction to “state the
reasons why it issued,” to “state its terms specifically,” and to “describe in
79
reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained or required.” My
suggestions essentially mirror these standard requirements. But the
unique features of lawsuits against intermediaries—including, in
particular, the awkward fit between the intermediary’s own behavior and
the prevention of consumer confusion—give the rules unique
significance in these cases and thus deserve attention.
A. Tailor the Injunction to the Defendant’s Wrongful Acts
Courts granting injunctions have an obligation to identify with
specificity the acts that justify injunctive relief, and to tailor their
80
injunction accordingly. This rule has particular relevance when the line
77

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 35 (1995).
The Restatement lists six factors that courts should consider in evaluating
“[t]he appropriateness and scope of injunctive relief” in trademark cases. Id. The
factors include: “(a) the nature of the interest to be protected; (b) the nature and
extent of the wrongful conduct; (c) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of an
injunction and of other remedies; (d) the relative harm likely to result to the
legitimate interests of the defendant if an injunction is granted and to the legitimate
interests of the plaintiff if an injunction is denied; (e) the interests of third persons
and of the public; (f) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or
otherwise asserting its rights; (g) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff;
and (h) the practicality of framing and enforcing the injunction.” Id.
79
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d); see generally Drywall Tapers, Local 1974 v. Local 530, 889
F.2d 389, 395 (2d Cir. 1989) (parties bound by injunction “must be able to ascertain
from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden”).
80
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d); see also Edu. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 545
(3d Cir. 1986) (“An injunction must not only meet the specificity requirement set
forth in Rule 65(d), it also cannot be broader than necessary to restrain the unlawful
conduct.”); E. W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1116 (8th Cir.
1969) (vacating an injunction that was “far broader than [was] warranted by the
findings of fact”); see generally Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S.
110, 126 (1948) (“The precise practices found to have violated the act should be
specifically enjoined.”), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
78
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between lawful and unlawful conduct is a fine one, so that a broad
81
injunction could proscribe or chill legitimate behavior.
Given the range of allegations against intermediaries and the but-for
relationship between intermediary behavior and plausible claims of
infringement, courts might feel tempted to broadly enjoin the use of a
plaintiff’s trademark after finding infringement in a particular case. They
should resist this temptation.
The nature of the intermediary’s wrongful act should dictate the
nature of the injunction. If the court finds infringement on a generalconfusion theory, it should identify with specificity how the
intermediary’s search policies are causing confusion, and the injunction
should remedy that problem. If, for example, the search engine confuses
users by failing to distinguish search results from ads, the injunction
should insist on a more careful differentiation. It should not—however
ardently the trademark holder might desire this result—prohibit the
general use of the trademark in keyword-based advertising, because of
82
the many legitimate and non-confusing uses of that service. Courts
should rarely, if ever, find liability based on failure to police; given that,
injunctive relief should avoid imposing such an obligation.
Injunctions in failure-to-respond cases will require a careful
examination of context. A court finding inadequate response to
notifications of obvious infringement, for example, might order the
defendant to adopt procedures that would enable a more effective
response. If the procedures are adequate but result in excessively bad
judgment in a particular case, the court could specify the feature of the
offending ad that was likely to cause confusion and could require the
intermediary to respond to future notifications regarding ads that shared
that feature. In all of these cases, the remedy should surgically address
the act that constituted infringement without affecting otherwise legal
behavior.
B. Be Specific
Courts have identified three reasons for the requirement of
specificity in crafting injunctive relief:
[First, it] prevents uncertainty on the part of those faced with
injunctive orders and gives them explicit notice of what conduct is
unlawful. Second, it allows a reviewing court “to know precisely
what it is reviewing.” . . . [Third,] a specific injunction allows those
who are protected by its terms to know when the order is being

81

Cf. Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 330 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding an
injunction overly broad when “the original scope of the valid trade secrets was so
narrow that expanded protection would tend to restrict competition”).
82
See, e.g., e360 Insight v. Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 605 (7th Cir. 2007)
(vacating an injunction where “the relief awarded does not bear a legitimate
relationship to the facts necessary to support” a judgment against the defendant).
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violated so that they may then effectively police the order and
83
enforce its mandate.

These rationales have special salience in cases involving uncertain
84
boundaries between lawful and unlawful behavior. In these cases, courts
must put parties on notice of which acts are illegal and will violate the
injunction. The absence of such guidance leaves parties guessing as to
whether their behavior falls within or beyond the injunction. This
guessing game could have three outcomes, all undesirable: the defendant
could guess wrong and engage in behavior that she viewed as protected
but turns out to form a basis for contempt; she could guess wrong in the
other direction and abstain from behavior that is desirable and legal; or
she could guess correctly but be moved by risk-aversion to avoid behavior
that falls close to the line.
This rule, too, has implications for intermediary claims. Because of
the significant non-infringing uses of trademarks online, courts must use
specificity in identifying behavior that they view as unlawful. In generalconfusion claims, the court should not simply insist that the intermediary
change its policies to cure any confusion; it should specify exactly how
the intermediary should alter its labeling or other practices to reduce the
risk of confusion. In failure-to-respond claims, courts should identify the
steps that an intermediary must take to improve the quality of its
response to notice of infringement.
C. Protect Lawful Uses
My third suggestion relates closely to the first one: courts should
ensure that injunctions neither proscribe nor chill legitimate uses of
85
marks, particularly those that promote trademark law’s goals. In crafting
83
Daniels v. Woodbury County, 742 F.2d 1128, 1134 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting
Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476–77 (1974)).
84
See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1982)
(vacating a trademark injunction that “unreasonably requires the parties to guess at
the kinds of conduct that will be deemed infringement”); see also Am. Red Cross v.
Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1412 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that
defendant “should not have to risk citation for contempt in order to determine the
true scope of activity barred by the district court’s order”); Am. Can Co., 742 F.2d at
333 (“The defendants cannot be expected to decide, even with caution, under the
threat of contempt whether their conduct is lawful without more guidance from the
court.”); E. W. Bliss Co., 408 F.2d at 1114 (reversing an injunction when “[t]he lower
court appears inclined to let the defendants reach the legal conclusion that a
particular design concept is a ‘trade secret’ of [the plaintiff]. These defendants would
then be able to test their legal opinion on the law of trade secrets and their technical
opinion on the state of the prior art in a proceeding to show cause why they should
not be held in contempt.”).
85
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 924 n.67 (1982) (vacating
an injunction that encompassed legal behavior, noting that the “injunction must be
modified to restrain only unlawful conduct and the persons responsible for conduct
of that character”); Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824 F.2d
665, 669 (8th Cir. 1987) (vacating an order that “too broadly requires [the
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injunctions, courts should have in mind the ways in which trademarks
may be used lawfully and should ensure that the injunction is not so
broad as to proscribe them.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cases alleging trademark infringement by online intermediaries
involve a tricky balance between the interests of the trademark holder
and the public. The traditional rules of contributory trademark
infringement have evolved to accommodate that balance. Courts
evaluating this new form of trademark claim should take care not to
upset that careful calibration, either in defining liability or in designing
relief.

defendant] to guess at what kind of conduct would be deemed trademark
infringement”); Edu. Testing Servs., 793 F.2d at 545 (narrowing a copyright injunction
whose prohibitions were “broader than the scope of the copyright laws”); Am.
Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imps., Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[A]
court may not enter an injunction the practical effect of which is to preclude the
defendant from using the functional features of the plaintiffs’ combination.”).

